

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 9426

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UR, US

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S GENEVA MEETING WITH GROMYKO JULY 9-10

REF: MOSCOW 9352

1. SINCE YOUR LAST MEETING WITH GROMYKO THERE HAS NOT BEEN MUCH MOVEMENT IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, PARTICULARLY ON ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES. DISAPPOINTED AT THEIR INABILITY TO MOVE THEIR ARAB FRIENDS TO FIND AN ACCEPTABLE FORMULA ON THE MEPC, THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN FAIRLY QUIET ON THE MIDDLE EAST, WITHHOLDING PUBLIC CRITICISM OF US WHILE NOT REVEALING ANY NEW APPROACHES OF THEIR OWN. ON CSCE--THEIR MOST URGENT PRIORITY--THEY HAVE MADE EXPECTED CONCESSIONS IN HOPES OF GETTING THE CONCLUDING SUMMIT. IN AREAS WHERE THEY HAVE BEEN ACCUSED OF MEDDLING--PORTUGAL, INDOCHINA, SOMALIA--THEY WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO LIE AS LOW AS POSSIBLE, BUT THEY FELT COMPELLED TO RESPOND TO THE SOMALI BASE ALLEGATIONS WITH REPEATED DISCLAIMERS AND TO DISOWN THE AUTHENTICITY OF A PURPORTED SOVIET INSTRUCTION TO WESTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES. THE HIGHLY TOUTED BREZHNEV SPEECH OF JUNE 13 PRODUCED ONLY ONE NEW ELEMENT--BREZHNEV'S REFERENCE TO BANNING NEW WEAPONS-- BUT IN HIS MEETING WITH THE SENATORIAL DELEGATION JULY 2 HE DID NOT GIVE A VERY CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT HE MEANT. WHILE SOVIET CRITICISM OF THE U.S. HAS BEEN MUTED, THEY HAVE

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EXPRESSED GREAT INDIGNATION--BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE-- AT RECENT

STATEMENTS BY SECRETARY SCHLESINGER, WHICH HAVE BEEN CHARACTERIZED HERE AS IRRESPONSIBLE.

2. AS WE HAVE NOTED (REFTEL), THE SOVIETS IN THE PAST TWO MONTHS HAVE REINFORCED THEIR EMPHASIS ON THE PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE OF THEIR TIES WITH THE UNITED STATES. THIS EMPHASIS WAS A MAJOR ASPECT OF BREZHNEV'S ELECTION SPEECH, AND EVEN SUSLOV, THE KREMLIN'S TOUGH AND CRUSTY CHIEF IDEOLOGIST, GAVE HIS PERSONAL IMPRIMATUR TO ENHANCING THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP IN THE KEYNOTE SPEECH TO THE HUMPHREY-SCOTT DELEGATION. WHILE THE SENATORIAL VISIT FURTHER REINFORCED TO THE SOVIETS THE WIDTH OF THE GULF THAT STILL SEPARATES CAPITOL HILL AND THE KREMLIN ON THE EMIGRATION ISSUE, THE DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN US WILL NOT DIVERT MOSCOW FROM CONTINUING TO ASSIGN TOP PRIORITY TO STRENGTHENING THE MOSCOW-WASHINGTON RELATIONSHIP, WHICH IS THE CORNERSTONE OF BREZHNEV'S PEACE POLICY AND IS STILL SEEN HERE AS A RESOUNDING SUCCESS.

3. THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO ASCRIBE GREAT POLITICAL IMPORTANCE TO SALT, AND THEY APPEAR TO UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS SEEN IN THE U.S. AS THE MOST CRITICAL ASPECT OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. SUSLOV IN ADDRESSING THE SENATORS REFERRED TO THE DESIRABILITY OF MOVING QUICKLY FROM SALT TWO TO TALKS ON REDUCTIONS. (HUMPHREY GROUP ALSO SEEMED TO FEEL THERE WAS SOME SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON VERIFICATION, ALTHOUGH THIS WAS NOT APPARENT TO EMBASSY OBSERVERS DURING THE TALKS.) THE LINKAGE THAT THE PRESIDENT AND YOU HAVE DRAWN BETWEEN A SALT AGREEMENT AND THE BREZHNEV VISIT HAS HIT HOME, AND NOW SOVIET MEDIA ALSO IMPLY A LINKAGE. WHILE THIS IS PARTLY TACTICAL (AS A WAY OF EXPLAINING THINGS IN CASE THE SUMMIT DOES NOT TAKE PLACE), IT SHOULD ALSO KEEP THE BUREAUCRACY HERE AWARE THAT THE BREZHNEV VISIT, WHICH THE SOVIETS CLEARLY WANT BADLY, WILL DEPEND ON SALT.

4. GROMYKO WILL EXPECT YOU TO ASK HIM ABOUT BREZHNEV'S REFERENCE TO BANNING NEW WEAPONS. WE HAVE NOT GOTTEN A VERY COMPLETE OR A VERY CONSISTENT LINE FROM THE SOVIETS ON THIS. BREZHNEV HIMSELF TOLD THE SENATORS THAT HE HAD CONFIDENTIAL

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IN MIND WEAPONS SYSTEMS SUCH AS THETRIDENT AND THE B-1, WHILE GROMYKO TOLD THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR LAST WEEK THAT THE PROPOSAL APPLIED TO "ALL POSSIBLE NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND NEW SYSTEMS INVOLVING EXISTING WEAPONS, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS." IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT AT THE HEART OF THE SOVIET IDEA (APART FROM ITS OBVIOUS PROPAGANDISTIC MOTIVATIONS) IS A FEAR OF BEING OUTDISTANCED BY U.S. WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY AND PERHAPS THE ULTIMATE DESIRE TO

REDUCE THE STAGGERING COSTS OF RESEARCH IN THIS AREA.
AT ANY RATE, OUR SOVIET CONTACTS HAVE HINTED THAT THE
BREZHNEV IDEA MAY TURN UP AS THIS YEAR'S SOVIET UNGA
PROPOSAL AND MAY (IN ADDITION OR ALTERNATIVELY) BE
INTRODUCED AS AN INITIATIVE IN THE U.S.-SOVIET CONTEXT.

5. IT IS HARD TO GUESS WHERE CSCE WILL BE BY THE TIME
YOU SEE GROMYKO. WE DO NOT THINK THE SOVIETS BLAME US FOR
THE DELAY, ALTHOUGH SUSLOV, IN CRITICIZING THE WESTERN
EUROPEANS, DID SAY THAT THE U.S. SHOULD DO MORE TO HELP.
UNDOUBTEDLY, THE SOVIETS WILL ALSO FEEL THAT THE U.S. HAS
AN "OBLIGATION" IN THE POST-CSCE PERIOD TO SEE THAT THEY
ARE NOT HELD TOO STRICTLY TO ACCOUNT ON THE RESPONSIBILITIES
OF BASKET THREE. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT, FROM THE VERY
OUTSET, WE SHOULD REJECT ANY SUCH EFFORT ON THEIR PART
AND, IN FACT, SHOULD SEIZE ALL AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITIES TO
MAKE CLEAR THAT WE TAKE SERIOUSLY THE CSCE RESPONSIBILITIES
REGARDING HUMAN CONTACTS. THE PRINCIPAL WESTERN ASSET IN
CSCE IS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN FORCED TO ACCEPT, AT
LEAST TO SOME DEGREE, THAT HUMANITARIAN ISSUES WHICH THEY
HAVE CLAIMED TO BE THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIR ARE NOW A FIT
SUBJECT FOR EAST-WEST DIALOGUE. MY VIEW IS THAT WE SHOULD
TRY TO HOLD THEM TO THEIR BASKET THREE RESPONSIBILITIES,
HOWEVER UNCOMFORTABLE THIS MAY BE. THERE ARE MANY REASONS
FOR THIS; PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT OVER THE LONG RUN IS
THAT CSCE PROVIDES ANOTHER LEVER (EVEN IF NOT A VERY
STRONG ONE) FOR ENCOURAGING THE SOVIETS TO LIBERALIZE
THEIR OWN SOCIETY.

6. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, THE SOVIETS ARE IN A HOLDING PATTERN,
WAITING TO SEE WHAT THE U.S. DOES NEXT. THEY ARE IMPATIENT
WITH THE U.S. REASSESSMENT PROCESS, BUT HAVE HELD BACK FROM
PUBLIC CRITICISM OF US. SPEAKING PRIVATELY TO THE
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HUMPHREY-SCOTT DELEGATION, IZVESTIYA EDITOR TOLKUNOV DID
GIVE VENT TO SOME IRRITATION, CHARGING THAT THE U.S. IS
APPARENTLY NOT READY TO COOPERATE WITH THE USSR. SOVIET
OFFICIALS, INCLUDING GROMYKO, HAVE CAREFULLY REFRAINED
FROM RULLING OUT PARTIAL MEASURES, BUT THEY HAVE NOT MADE
CLEAR HOW MUCH OF A ROLE FOR THE GENEVA CONFERENCE THEY
WILL INSIST ON. THEIR TIMETABLE FOR GENEVA SEEMS TO BE
RELAXED--SYTENKO'S DEPUTY PYRLIN HAS SPOKEN VAGUELY OF
NOVEMBER. AS USUAL, GROMYKO WILL WANT A FULL REPORT ON
WHAT THE U.S. IS UP TO, AND HE MAY GET PRICKLIER IN
INSISTING ON THE FACT, NOT JUST THE PROMISE, OF SOVIET
PARTICIPATION.

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FOR THE SECRETARY

7. IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD THE SOVIETS SEEM TO FEEL THAT EVENTS ARE MOVING IN THEIR DIRECTION BUT THAT THIS ALSO ENTAILS PROBLEMS. THEY WERE NO DOUBT RELIEVED THAT THE SENATORS DID NOT MENTION INDOCHINA OR PORTUGAL; THE AMERICANS DID PRESS ON BERBERA BUT GOT ONLY VAGUE DENIALS. IN THE POST-VIETNAM SITUATION THE SOVIETS, IN THE COMPETITION WITH CHINA (MOSCOW 6800), WILL BE MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA TO PICK THE FRUITS OF THEIR COOPERATION WITH HANOI. AWARE OF THE SENSITIVITIES AND IN SOME CASES HOSTILITIES OF COUNTRIES IN ASIA, THEY WILL MOVE CAREFULLY, BUT WE EXPECT THEM TO PRESS THEIR DRIVE FOR INFLUENCE AS FAR AND AS FAST AS POSSIBLE. IN THEIR OBSESSION WITH PEKING, THEY NO LONGER SEE THE U.S. AS THE MAJOR ADVERSARY IN ASIA, NOR DO THEY FEEL THAT THE MOST BASIC INTERESTS OF OUR TWO NATIONS IN A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES OF THE REGION ARE NECESSARILY INCOMPATIBLE. IN SOME CASES THEY ARE RIGHT--IN KOREA, FOR EXAMPLE, WHERE WE SHARE A DESIRE TO AVOID WAR. FROM HERE IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE SOVIETS MAY WELL HAVE A POINT; THAT ONCE THE DUST HAS SETTLED IN INDOCHINA, SOUTHEAST ASIA WOULD SEEM AN AREA IN WHICH--GIVEN THE GREAT-POWER BALANCES THERE--POLITICAL, RATHER THAN MILITARY FACTORS, WILL COME TO PREDOMINATE AND "HEGEMONY" WILL BECOME ONLY A REAL AND FEVERISH ISSUE IN THE DRAFTING OF COMMUNIQUE. IN SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT, I DOUBT THAT OUR INTERESTS WILL BE GREATLY AFFECTED BY AN INCREASED SOVIET PRESENCE.

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8. SOVIET INTERESTS IN THE RED SEA - INDIAN OCEAN AREA REMAIN A PUZZLE. WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT THE SOVIETS HAVE IN MIND IN SOMALIA, BUT WE ARE NOT PERSUADED THAT THEY ARE CONTEMPLATING A MASSIVE EFFORT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. THEIR OVERRIDING INTEREST IS PROBABLY TO PUT THEMSELVES IN A POSITION IN THE RED SEA AND INDIAN OCEAN WHERE THEY COULD COMPLICATE MATTERS IN A REGION OF MAJOR ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE TO THE WEST AND JAPAN, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE OF COURSE ALSO INTERESTED IN A HOSPITABLE CLIMATE FOR THEIR NAVY, IN ENHANCING THEIR INFLUENCE IN AFRICA AND WITH THE THIRD WORLD GENERALLY, AND IN PROTECTING A SEA ROUTE FROM EUROPEAN RUSSIA TO THE SOVIET FAR EAST. NONE OF THESE FACTORS REQUIRES A MASSIVE SOVIET PRESENCE. NEITHER IS IT LIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD WANT TO BE BOUND TO A REDUCTION OR AN ELIMINATION OF THAT PRESENCE. THEREFORE, WE SEE THEIR VERBAL SUPPORT FOR THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS ON INDIAN OCEAN ZONES OF PEACE AND NAVAL LIMITATIONS AS BASICALLY PROPAGANDISTIC AND NOT SERIOUS.

9. ANOTHER ISSUE WHICH MAY NOT COME UP WITH GROMYKO BUT ON WHICH YOU SHOULD BE ALERTED CONCERNS LAW OF THE SEA. DURING AMBASSADOR MOORE'S RECENT TALKS IN MOSCOW, THE SOVIETS EXPRESSED STRONG CONCERN ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A UNILATERAL U.S. DECLARATION OF A 200-MILE EXCLUSIVE FISHING ZONE AND SAID THEY WOULD NOT RECOGNIZE SUCH A DECLARATION. MOORE NOTED THE CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE AND CALLED ON THE SOVIETS TO OFFER A "DRAMATIC AND POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT" GESTURE OF SELF-RESTRAINT WHICH COULD BE USED TO HEAD OFF CONGRESS. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD CONSIDER NEGOTIATING WITH US ON SUCH A GESTURE. IF THE OCCASION ARISES, IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR YOU TO REFER TO THE CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE, TO SAY THAT--WHILE WE CANNOT GUARANTEE PREVENTIVE MEASURES WILL WORK--WITHOUT THEM THERE IS LITTLE CHANCE OF STOPPING THE MOMENTUM, AND TO OFFER TO DISCUSS ANY INITIATIVES THE SOVIETS MAY WISH TO PROPOSE. LAW OF THE SEA IS A TOPIC OF SIGNIFICANT INTEREST TO MOSCOW, AND ONE ON WHICH WE HAVE COOPERATED SUCCESSFULLY. PASSAGE OF U.S. LEGISLATION COULD QUICKLY PUT US AT LOGGERHEADS.
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10. GROMYKO MAY ALSO WISH TO RAISE THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW EMBASSIES. THE SOVIETS ARE WORKING DAY AND NIGHT TO FINALLY CLEAR OUR PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION SITE. THEY HAVE KNOCKED

DOWN TWO LARGE BUILDINGS ON THE SITE IN THE PAST MONTH AND ARE NOW CLEARING AWAY THE DEBRIS. WHAT THIS PROVES IS THAT ONCE THEY ARE PRODDED FROM THE TOP, AS THEY WERE BY DOBRYNIN, SOVIET BUREAUCRACY CAN MOVE QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY. WITHOUT SUCH PRODDING, HOWEVER, SOVIET BUREAUCRACY MOVES WITH ROUGHLY THE SPEED OF AN ANTEATER. FOR THISREASON, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF PARALLEL MOVEMENT ON EMBASSY CONSTRUCTION IN BOTH MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON SHOULD BE ADHERED TO, AND THAT THIS IS THE ONLY REALISTIC WAY WE WILL GET FULL COOPERATION FROM THE SOVIETS IN PUTTING UP OUR EMBASSY HERE. THIS PRINCIPLE IS ALSO IMPORTANT IN MOVING AHEAD ON THE KIEV-NEW YORK CONSULATES, WHERE THE SOVIETS ALSO WANT TO MOVE AT A FASTER PACE IN THE U.S. THAN WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR US IN THE USSR. OUR OWN BUREAUCRACY HAS BEEN VERY SLOW, OF COURSE, IN CONNECTION WITH OUR EMBASSY PLANS, AND WE NEED TO PUSH AHEAD WITH THEM TO ENSURE THAT OUR PROJECT TAKES SHAPE IN A REASONABLE TIME FRAME.

11. IN CONCLUSION, THE SOVIETS ARE CURRENTLY RELATIVELY SATISFIED WITH THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES AND ANXIOUS TO BOLSTER IT. WE DO NOT EXPECT A HARDENING OF SOVIET POSITIONS AFTER CSCE IS CONCLUDED THIS SUMMER (ASSUMING IT IS). IN FACT, THE SOVIETS NEED A PROCESSION OF DETENTE "EVENTS," AND PROSPECTS FOR MBFR WILL IMPROVE SIGNIFICANTLY AFTER CSCE, PARTICULARLY IF NATO ADOPTS OPTION THREE. THE SOVIETS WILL ALSO WANT A SUCCESSFUL COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE UNDER THEIR BELTS, LEADING UP TO THE CPSU 25TH CONGRESS, AND IT IS CLEAR THEY WILL HAVE TO MAKE CONCESSIONS TO THE ITALIANS, YUGOSLAVS AND ROMANIANS IF THEY ARE TO GET IT. CHINA REMAINS AN OVERRIDING OBSESSION OF THE LEADERSHIP AND CASTS A SHADOW ON ALL MAJOR ISSUES. BREZHNEV'S WASHINGTON SUMMIT IS VERY MUCH IN THE FOREFRONT OF THEIR THINKING. AS I SEE IT, THE ONLY QUESTIONS NOW IN SIGHT WHICH COULD CAUSE A REAL SETBACK IN OUR RELATIONS WOULD BE A FAILURE IN SALT OR A BREAKDOWN OF BILATERAL COMMUNICATIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

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